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ELIMINATING THE EFFECTS OF A STATUS CHARACTERISTIC
The theory and experiment reported here follow directly and cumula­
tively from previous research that concerned itself with the effects of 
status characteristics in small groups (Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch,
1966; Cohen, Berger, and Zelditch, forthcoming; Freese, 1969; Moore, 1968) 
This previous research offered an explanation for the emergence of observ­
able power and prestige orders in small task-focused groups when members 
of those groups were discriminated by some diffuse status characteristic, 
such as age, sex, race, occupation, and so forth. By observable power 
and prestige order was meant the distribution of action opportunities, 
performance outputs, evaluations of those outputs, and influence in the 
group (Berger and Connor, 1969) .
Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch (1966) proposed a theory asserting 
that if a diffuse status characteristic were the only basis of discrimi­
nation between actors, and if the actors were forced to differentiate 
themselves in terms of relative power and prestige, then because o f  
global performance expectations associated with the status characteristic 
--expectations such as, "Men are smarter than women"— the actors would 
differentiate on the basis of who ranked high or low on the characteristic 
The most important notion in their theory concerned the generalization of 
performance expectations from the status characteristic to a group 
problem-solving situation to which the characteristic is not initially 
relevant. The assumptions of their theory specified the process by which 
this generalization was believed to take place, and predicted the observ­
able power and prestige order in the task situation to be a function of 
those generalized performance expectations.
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A similar formulation was proposed by Moore (1968), and experi­
mental observations taken by him using prestige of educational affilia­
tions as a general status characteristic, tended to conform relevant 
predictions from both of these formulations. Building upon Moore's 
experimental results Cohen, Berger, and Zelditch (forthcoming) 
conducted a more elaborate test designed to isolate the steps in this 
generalization process. Using ^ir Force rank as a status characteris­
tic and using relative influence rates as an indicator of observable 
power and prestige, they found that Air Force non-Coms were more 
likely to be influenced by officers than by enlisted men whether or 
not the task was directly related to the status characteristic.
Both of these investigations provided a demonstration of and an 
explanation for the generalization effect. Both formulations speci­
fied a set of sufficient conditions under which beliefs associated 
with status would generalize to new situations resulting in an 
observable power and prestige order consistent with differentiation 
on the status characteristic. To determine if the conditions speci­
fied by these formulations were not only sufficient but were also 
necessary, Freese (1969) constructed a formulation that differed 
significantly from its predecessors only in that the initial basis of 
discrimination between the actors was not a diffuse status characteris­
tic but was instead a specific performance characteristic. By specific 
performance characteristics were meant such abilities as the ability 
to speak well in public, to compose music, or to throw a football 
accurately. It was felt that if the limited information conveyed by 
possession of a specific performance characteristic would also
generalize in a similar manner to determine an observable power and 
prestige order in a new task situation, then a conceptual tool might 
be available that would permit us to specify conditions when a diffuse 
status characteristic would not generalize to a new task situation.
The formulation proposed by Freese (196S) asserted that expecta­
tions associated with a specific performance characteristic would 
determine an observable power and prestige order in a new task situation 
if the characteristic were directly related to at least one other 
specific performance characteristic. Otherwise, the generalization 
process was postulated to be less likely to occur. This formulation 
was clearly supported by experimental observations which utilized the 
same measure of influence as an indicator of observable power and 
prestige that had been used by Moore (1968), and Cohen, Berger, and 
Zelditch (forthcoming).
From these investigations we can draw the following set of con­
clusions: (1) Under specified task conditions, an observable power 
and prestige order will emerge in a small, task-oriented group if:
(a) the actors are discriminated by some diffuse status characteristic; 
or (b) the actors are discriminated by two or more directly related 
specific performance characteristics; (2) In either case members in the 
group will occupy positions in the observable power and prestige order 
that are consistent with their state of the characteristic that dis­
criminates members of the group; (3) In either case the characteristic 
that initially discriminates the actors, though not initially related 
to the task on which observable power and prestige is measured, never­
theless seem to generalize to the initially unrelated task situation.
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3ut how does this generalization process occur when actors are 
discriminated by a diffuse status characteristic and two or more 
directly related specific performance characteristics? In particular, 
how does this generalization occur when an actor is high on the status 
characteristic but low on the performance characteristics, or low on 
the status characteristic but high on the performance characteristic? 
iJe shall now present a theory that deals with this case. Our purpose 
is to specify a set of sufficient conditions that, when operable, 
eliminates the generalizing effect of the status characteristic. To 
develop this formulation requires us to analyze and define some of our 
central concepts and to specify a set of initial conditions under which 
the formulation is expected to apply.
No theory can be said to apply to all situations. It is therefore 
incumbent upon us to specify when the theory applies and when it 
doesn't. The formulation about to be developed is asserted to apply 
when the following set of conditions is met. This set of scope 
conditions is identical to the set of task conditions stipulated by 
Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch (1965) and Freese (1969). Taken as a whole, 
we itfill refer to these conditions as "task situation o" or simply "3".
Two actors, p and o, are interacting with respect to each other.
.Je shall view the situation from the point of view of only one of tne 
actors, p, and we shall treat the other elements in the situation, 
including o, as objects of orientation for p. P may also be an object 
of orientation to himself, herein designated by p'. P must perform a 
task in conjunction with o; that is, the task must be "collective" in 
that it is both necessary and legitimate for p to take o's behavior into 
account. The task has two outcomes, "success" and "failure", and we
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assume p is motivateci to achieve the success outcome. In this sense 
p is "task-focused". Further we assume there is some performance 
characteristic, C, that is specifically instrumental to successful task 
performance. Je assume that p has no knowledge of his performance 
level on C with respect to o. It is appropriate at this point to 
define precisely what is meant by the term "specific performance 
characteristic".
Definition 1. Specific Performance Characteristic (C).
A specific performance characteristic, C, is any 
characteristic of an actor for which it is the case 
that
(1) there are at least trfo states, such that there 
is associated with each state a different 
probability of successful task performance, and
(2) the states of the characteristic are differentially 
evaluated.
For purposes of simplifying the analysis, we will analyze a 
specific performance characteristic as if it had only two states, one 
high and one low. That is, p believes there is a state, Ca, which will 
contribute to the success outcome of the task relative to another state 
C^, which will contribute to the failure outcome. P may possess either 
the high state of C or the low state of C with respect to o. The 
comparison is relative. If p possesses the high state of C, then he 
simply believes he has a higher probability of performing the task 
successfully than o. If p were to choose a different o for comparison 
he might believe himself less likely to perform the task well. Je refer
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to these relative beliefs about the probability of successful task 
performance as specific performance expectations, and we assert that 
specific performance expectations are in one-to-one correspondence xiith 
states of a specific performance characteristic. Since states of C are 
instrumental to the performance of the task, it is assumed that p 
attaches differential value to each state; that is, he feels it is 
more desirable to possess the high state of C than the low state of C.
Me wish now to introduce the first of two elements that will 
discriminate p' and o in C from p's point of view, and it is given that 
these are the only bases of discrimination between the actors. The 
first element is a general performance characteristic, which was the 
basis of discrimination between the actors in the research reported by 
Freese (1963). It is defined as follows:
Definition 2. General Performance Characteristic (G).
A. general performance characteristic G is any character­
istic of an actor for which it is the case that: There are 
at least two states, such that each state consists only of 
a set of symmetrically related states of specific perform­
ance characteristics having the same evaluation.
By set is meant a collection of at least two or more states of character­
istics. By symmetrically related, or symmetrically relevant, is meant 
that possession of any one member of the set implies the expected 
possession, from p's point of view, of all members of the set. Consider, 
for example, a characteristic like musical ability. If musical ability 
were a general performance characteristic, the set associated with the 
high state of G might contain the high state of ability to play the 
piano and the high state of ability to read music. Our requirement of
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"symmetrically related" means that the high state of ability to read 
music implies the high state of ability to play the piano and vice 
versa, life will say more about this example below. Since a general 
performance characteristic consists of two or more specific performance 
characteristics, by inference the states of G are differentially 
evaluated and those states have associated with them different proba­
bilities of successful task performance, as in the case with C, we 
will analyze G as if it had only two states, one having a positive 
evaluation and the other having a negative evaluation.
The second element is S which ^e assume discriminates the actors 
is a diffuse status characteristic, which we will also analyze as if 
it had only two states. If race were the characteristic, the two 
states might be white and non-white. A diffuse status characteristic 
is defined as follows:
Definition 3. Diffuse Status Characteristic (D).
A diffuse status characteristic D is any characteristic
of an actor for which it is the case that:
(1) the states of D are differentially evaluated,
(2) to each state, x, of D there corresponds a distinct 
set of > of specifically associated, evaluated, 
states of characteristics, and
(3) to each state, x, of D there corresponds a distinct 
general expectation state GES , having the sameX
evaluation as the state D .x
Two comments need be made at this point. First, the concept of a 
general expectation state refers to a single, global evaluation of a
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actor, and it has been argued to imply evaluations of moral worth as 
well as evaluations of performance capabilities (Zelditch, 3erger, and 
Cohen, 1966). The concept of Boston Brahmin, for example, conveys 
different overall evaluation that the concept of industrial worker.
From Definition 2 it should be clear that no such all-encomoassing 
evaluation is attached to a general performance characteristic. Second,
<5 of D, the set of specific performance characteristics that is associated 
with D, does not contain elements that are given to be symmetrically 
related to each other and does not contain elements all of which are 
given to have the same evaluation. This set, therefore, is a decidedly 
different set of specific performance characteristics than that attached 
to a general performance characteristic. ie should elaborate and discuss 
these differences with some illustrations, since these differences pro­
vide the basis for the formulation we are about to present.
A diffuse status characteristic conveys a significant amount of 
information about a person. Knowing an actor's state of D seems to 
activate an entire set of beliefs about that actor. Some white 
employers, for example, believe Negro employees are not as intelligent, 
not as dependable, not as industrious, but better able to withstand 
high temperatures than white employees (Wilson and Gilmore, 1943).
Notice that the set of performance characteristics attributed to 
Negroes in this case is "mixed"; that is, not all of these characteris­
tics have the same evaluation: An industrial employer will positively 
evaluate an employee who can withstand high temperatures, but will 
negatively evaluate the other characteristics. Furthermore, knowing 
that an individual has one of these characteristics does not permit any
inferences about whether or not he has any of the other characteristics. 
The set of specific performance characteristics attributed to the status 
characteristic race is a loose conglomeration at best. But this is not 
the case with the set of characteristics that constitute a general 
performance characteristic.
Jhat does it mean to say that someone is a good musician, and 
precisely what are the qualities associated with good musicianship? We 
argue that to be a good musician is not to possess simply one ability, 
it is to possess a composite of several abilities. Insofar as musical 
ability is a composite of several abilities, it provides a good deal of 
information about a person. ;\n individual who has perfect pitch, can 
compose music, can play the piano, can play the guitar, and has a know­
ledge of musical theory we would be inclined to call a good musician.
If he lacked one of those abilities, we might still be inclined to call 
him a good musician, ind though we do not know he would be a good 
violinist, we would be inclined to predict success for him if he gave 
that task some effort. If he possessed only one of those abilities we 
listed, however, we might not be inclined to predict success for him at 
a similar task, indeed we would probably not call him a good musician. 
But knowing that there is a set of specific performance characteristics 
at which he excels, and knowing that the members of that set are 
related to each other, and knowing that other characteristics or 
abilities can be related to the members of that set (if he takes up the 
violin, for example), we are much more likely to generalize to other 
tasks that are similar to musical tasks.
A general performance characteristic, then, is an "open" set;
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that is, other characteristics can be added to it when an actor feels 
it is warranted. ,Je believe the set of task conditions we have estab­
lished here will result in the actor deciding it is more warranted to 
consider expanding the set G than the set~* of D. .Je will now formulate 
our problem precisely and propose a set of assumptions which describe 
this process.
;Je have two actors, p and o, interacting under a set of task 
conditions already specified. These actors are discriminated only by 
states of a general performance characteristic (G) and states of a 
diffuse status characteristic (D). In addition, as one of the task 
conditions there is a specific performance characteristic (C) on which 
the actors are as yet undiscriminated which is instrumental to successful 
task performance. The relations between G, D and C may be stated simply: 
Each of these elements is given to be neither associated with nor dis­
sociated from the other elements at the outset; in other words, whether 
G, D and C are related to each other or not is initially unknown.
Since p and o are discriminated by both states of G and states of 
D, there are four possible ways in which the actors may differ. (1) P 
may have the high state of D and the high state of G; (2) P may have the 
high state of D and the lov? state of G; (3) P may have the low state of 
D and the high state of G; (4) P may have the low state of D and the low 
state of G. Our concern here will be only with cases 2 and 3, where p 
is high on D and low on G, or low on D and high on G. The problem to be 
answered by the formulation and the experiment is, how does p assign 
states of C to himself and o by generalizing from the states of the D 
and G characteristics he and o possess? If and when such generalization
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occurs p will have differentiated himself into either a high position 
or a low position in the observable power and prestige order with 
respect to o in task situation S.
There are three means by which states of C could be generalized 
from states of D and G: (1) P could assign states of C on the basis 
of only the states of D he and o possess; (2) P could assign states of 
C on the basis of only the states of G he and o possess; (3) P could 
assign states of C on the basis of both the states of D and G he and
o possess. Je want now to present a set of assumptions which argues 
that p will assign states of C on the basis of the states of G he and
o possess, and not on the basis of states of D and not on the basis of 
some combination of D and G.
Assumption 1. (Activation).
If D and G are the only social bases of discrimination 
between p' and o in S, then D and G are each activated 
in S.
To "activate" a characteristic means to cognitively consider its 
possible relevance to the situation at hand. It should not surprise us 
that an actor in an ambiguous situation would conjure up what informa­
tion is available to him and think about whether or not it applies to 
his situation. The only information available to p is the states of D 
and G that p* and o possess, and these states are inconsistent with 
each other. P must think about this, but merely to be aware of 
the differences between p' and o on these characteristics does not 
mean that p will decide all of this information is relevant to task 
situation S in which he finds himself, vie argue he will decide
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only some of it is relevant. Definition 4 tells what we mean by 
"relevant". Assumption 2.1 and 2.2 specify a set of conditions for 
the formation of relevance between states of G and states of C from 
p's point of view. If these assumptions are true, then p will not 
decide that states of D are relevant to states of C and he will not 
decide that states of both D and G are relevant to states of C.
Definition 4. Relevance:
\n  element e^ is relevant to an element e^ if 
it is the case that: If x^ possesses e^, then 
x^ is expected to possess e^.
Assumption 2.1. (Relevance).
If elements e and e, can become relevant to
i J
element e. , then both e and e will become k’ i j
relevant to e only if: k
(1) e and e. are relevant to each other, or
i J
(2) e. and e. have the same evaluation, or
(3) either e, or ej ^as n0 sub-elements.
The phrase "can become relevant to" in the assumption implies that a 
relevance relation has not yet been formed between two elements but 
that such a relation can potentially be formed, though it need not be. 
The term "sub-elements" refers to the constituent parts of the element 
in question. G, for example, consists by definition of two or more 
constituent parts or sub-elements; a single specific performance 
characteristic has only one constituent part or no sub-elements;
D has multiple sub-elements because of the set"x of specific character­
istics associated with it.
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Assumption 2.1 is a very general proposition whose utility is 
not restricted to the formulation presented here. Je employ it in the 
present context to rule out the possibility of some "combination 
effect" between D and G in the determination of the observable power 
and prestige order. There should be no combination effect because the 
three necessary conditions for combining stipulated by Assumption 2.1 
are not present in task situation 3. From p's point of view, D and G 
are not relevant to each other, they do not have the same evaluation, 
and each has multiple sub-elements. Therefore, only D or G but not 
both can become relevant to C if the assumption is correct. (It 
should be noted that Assumption 2.1 does not rule out the possibility 
that D and G can be made relevant by some external source, such as 
an experimenter, even if D and G have different evaluations. Our 
formulation deals with the process that operates on an actor in 
situation S in the absence of external intervention or constraint.)
Given that only one of the discriminating characteristics, D or 
G, will become relevant to C, the question now becomes, which one?
It may be the case that one of the discriminating characteristics is 
more similar to C than the other. Je use Definition 5 to explicate a 
concept of the similarity of characteristics.
Definition 5. Similarity.
An element is similar to an element e^ if and only 
if e^ is not excluded from being symmetrically related
to e . and from having the same evaluation as e ..
J J
As a corollary, which follows directly from Definition 5, we have
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Corollary: If either e^ or consists of sub-elements, 
then e^ is similar to e^ if and only if all of those 
sub-elements are symmetrically related and have the 
same evaluation.
Since the element, e^, consisting of sub-elements with differing evalua­
tions precludes e. from having the sane evaluation as e^ (that is, it 
can have the same evaluation as some elements of e but not of others), 
e^ is then excluded from being similar to e. from the last part of 
Definition 5. Cince by definition G consists of sub-elements with the 
same evaluation, whereas D does not, we have the basis for using 
similarity as a mechanism with G, but not with D.
G and >  of D are each sets of specific performance characteristics 
and each of these sets is potentially expandable: Other characteristics 
can be added to each set, such as our unassigned task characteristic C. 
lie will not argue that C actually becomes a member of either set, but 
we do believe if one set consists of characteristics that are consistent­
ly evaluated and symmetrically related, it is "easier" for that set to 
be expanded to include any undefined characteristic that is not believed 
to be excluded; and this process of "set expansion" should be facilitated 
even further if symmetrical relations and consistent evaluations are 
maintained. Now in the context of our present problem, C is similar to 
G but not similar to D because y  of D is not given to have the special 
properties we attribute to G. How do these properties make a difference? 
To be absent-minded, intellectual, and impractical does not mean that an 
actor is a professor, and we would be reluctant to conclude that he 
would excel at logical reasoning. But to be able to run fast, to have
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excellent motor coordination, to be able to withstand physical duress, 
and to be in prime physical condition does mean an actor is a good 
athlete, and we could reasonably expect him to excel at tennis even 
if he had not yet learned that game.
Je have shown with .assumption 2.1 that D and G will not combine 
to determine observable power and prestige in S. D alone or G alone 
must generalize to the task situation. ie believe the similarity of 
the task characteristic C to the performance characteristic G is 
sufficient to explain why the status characteristic will not generalize. 
It will not generalize because, unlike G, it does not have the two 
properties we believe are the strongest inducements to initiate the 
expectation-generalization process: a consistent evaluation and a 
symmetrical relation of its component parts.
\ssumption 2.2 (Relevance).
If D and G are activated in and if C is similar to 
G, then G becomes relevant to C.
Note carefully that while symmetry is a property of G, and C is 
not excluded from being symmetrically related to G, assumption 2.2 
states only that G becomes relevant to C, not that C also becomes 
relevant to G. Symmetry is not assumed to be a property of the G-C 
relation: the only requirement is that G is potentially symmetrically 
relevant to C, that is, that C is not excluded from being a member of 
the G set. Assumption 2.2 does not say that C becomes a member. The 
fact that it can become a member we believe facilitates the generali­
zation process. However, it is sufficient for our purposes to specify 
only when an asymmetrical relation obtains between G and C, for once
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G is relevant to C, even if only asymmetrically, performance expecta­
tions for C should be assigned in a manner consistent with p's state 
of G.
Assumption 3. (Consistent Assignment).
If G is relevant to C, then p will assign states of 
C to himself and o in a manner that is consistent 
with their respective states of G.
Assumption 3 asserts that p will assign the state of C to himself 
and o that has the same evaluation as the state of G they each possess. 
Go if p' possesses the positively evaluated state of G, for example, 
and o possesses the negatively evaluated state, then p will decide 
that p 1 possesses the positively evaluated state of C and o possesses 
the negatively evaluated state of C.
Having assigned states of C in the task situation, p now has 
specific performance expectations for himself and o; that is, he has 
decided tfho is likely to perform better at the task. If p has decided 
who is more likely to perform better at the task, and if his views are 
shared by o, then it is reasonable to expect that the actor for whom 
the higher expectations are held might have more opportunities to 
present his ideas, be more likely to be consulted for suggestions, be 
more likely to have his proposals for the solution of the task favor­
ably evaluated, and be more likely to exercise influence in the group. 
This distribution of action opportunities, performance outputs, evalua­
tions of performance, and influence exercised, taken as a whole, we 
refer to as the observable power and prestige order of the group. It 
seems reasonable to assume that relative positions in the observable
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power and prestige order of the group would be a function of the expec­
tations that have been assigned for performance on the group task.
Assumption 4. (Power and Prestige).
If p has assigned states of C to himself and o, and, 
therefore, has specific performance expectations for 
p 1 and o, then the observable power and prestige order 
is a direct function of those specific performance 
expectations.
If Assumption 4 is correct, then the observable power and prestige 
order in the group should be a function of the expectations for perform 
ance p has assigned for himself and o at the task. If Assumption 3 is 
correct, those performance expectations should be assigned in a manner 
consistent with the manner in which p' and o are discriminated on the 
general performance characteristic. If Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 are 
correct, those performance expectations should be a function only of p 1 
and o's states of the general performance characteristic and not their 
states of the diffuse status characteristic, because the task character 
istic, C, is similar to G and not similar to D. If Assumption 1 is 
correct, p has the option of deciding that G or D or both or neither 
provide him with information relevant to determining which performance 
expectations are appropriate.
An Experimental Test
To provide a test of the main predictions of this formulation is 
simple and straightforward. /Je require two person groups and a design 
having six conditions. Depending upon to which condition a subject is 
randomly assigned, he will find that, in relation to his partner, he
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possesses: (1) the high state of a D; (2) the low state of a D; (3) the
high state of a G; (4) the low state of a G; (5) the high state of a D
and the low state of a G; (5) the low state of a D and the high state of
a G. We further require a task situation that meets the conditions
specified that will permit us to observe if the subjects differentiate
themselves in terms of relative power and prestige. It is appropriate
1
to describe the general features of this experimental situation.
Berger and Conner (1959) identify four components of an observable 
power and prestige order, but in order to facilitate greater experimental
control only one of these components is operationalized in this experi-
2
mental situation, namely influence. This is done in the following way.
This is a standardized experimental situation that has been 
employed with considerable success to observe differentiation in relative
power and prestige. Gee Berger and Conner (1959).
2 This standardized experimental situation is structured so that 
the other components of the observable pojer and prestige order can be 
experimentally controlled. The distribution of action opportunities, 
performance outputs, and communicated evaluations are not allowed to 
vary so that the distribution of influence may be studied as dependent 
behavior. If these other components were studied as dependent behavior, 
however, by Assumption 4 of the theory they should give similar results 
for the distribution of observable power and prestige, since these 
various components are assumed to be intercorrelated (Berger and 
Conner, 1959) .
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Two subjects are seated in a room such that they cannot see each 
other. Their task is to view a series of slides, each of which has some 
property about which the subject must make a binary judgment. Each 
subject makes a preliminary choice which is communicated via a machine 
to his partner, and then after a short delay makes a final choice which 
is not communicated. The subjects are told by the host experimenter 
that ability to make correct decisions on these slides depends upon 
their possessing a specific perceptual ability. Since he may make only 
one of two choices on each slide with respect to the property in question, 
the subject must find himself either agreeing with his partner or dis­
agreeing »Jith his partner after each makes an initial choice. The 
device on which the subject indicates his choice is constructed such 
that an assistant experimenter in an adjoining room may systematically 
control the information about initial choices that subjects exchange.
In fact, throughout the course of a large number of slide presentations, 
the subject finds himself in nearly continuous disagreement with his 
partner about the correct answer to the slide when they make their 
initial choices. Faced •;ith a disagreement on each initial choice and 
faced with the requirement to make a final decision each time, the 
subject must either stay with his initial choice or change his initial 
choice such that it agrees with his partner's. If he changes his initial 
choice it is assumed that he has been influenced by his partner; if he 
does not change his initial choice it is assumed he has not been 
influenced. \  subject may either be influenced or not influenced, then, 
on any given trial. ince the experiment consists of n trials, there 
will be for each subject a ratio of the number of times he was influ­
enced to the total number of times he could have been influenced. This
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ratio is averaged across all subjects in a given experimental condition, 
yielding an overall rate for which subjects in the condition accepted or 
rejected influence attempts. The proportion of times subjects reject 
influence attempts is interpreted as the probability of a Self- or 
S-resolution, which constitutes the indicator for the development of a 
power and prestige order.
Using this measure of influence as our indicator of relative power 
and prestige, we may now state the predictions implied by our theory.
.Je should point out that, strictly speaking, our formulation can make 
predictions only for Conditions 5 and 6. Conditions 1 and 2 are 
controls for this experiment and are predicted by the theories of 
Berger, Cohen and Zelditch (1965) and Moore (1968). Conditions 3 anc 4 
are also controls and are predicted by the formulation of Freese (1253). 
Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 of our theory predict the status characteristics 
should have no effect in determining the probability of an 3-resolution, 
.?hen both a G and a D are activated. To check the accuracy of this 
prediction we must compare subjects who have the high state of D and 
the low state of G (DII-GL) with both sets of subjects who ha e only a 
high state of D (DH'' or a low state of G (GL) ; and we must compare sub­
jects who have the low state of D and tha high state of G (DL-GH) with 
both sets of subjects who have only the low state of D (DL) or the high 
state of G (GH). In order to make meaningful comparisons to test our 
formulation we must first observe in terms of our measure of rejecting 
influence attempts that:
(1) DH is greater than DL, and
(2) GH is greater than GL
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The predictions our theory makes for the experimental conditions are as 
follows:
(1) DH-GL does not differ from GL, and
(2) DL-GH does not differ from GH.
•Je will now describe the experimental situation for subjects in the 
DH-GL and DL-GH conditions, used to test the above predictions.
'■'ubjects were junior college females between the ages of 18 and 2 1. 
Each subject upon arriving was escorted to an isolated room where she 
was informed by the experimenter that she would be taking part in two 
studies. This first study would require her to take two tests. These 
tests were supposedly measures of two abilities (in fact, fictitious) 
known as "Meaning Insight Ability" and "Contrast Sensitivity". The 
Meaning Insight test consisted of matching an English word with one of 
two words from an obscure foreign language. The Contrast Sensitivity 
test required the subject to discriminate a geometrical figure from a 
set of four geometrical figures on the criterion "Which figure doesn't 
belong with the other three?" Prior to taking each test the subject read 
a page of instructions which explained the "ability" she /?as about to be 
tested on. Each set of instructions informed the subject that both of 
these abilities were highly correlated with each other, but that neither 
ability was necessarily related to general intelligence, nor to mathe­
matical, artistic or lingual skills. After conroleting both tests, each 
subject was taken by the experimenter to another building where she was 
presented to a second experimenter who informed her that this was where 
the second study would take place.
The "second" study was conducted with the use of closed circuit 
television. Each subject had a television monitor, camera, and
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microphone present in her individual room. To maintain a standardized 
presentation of instructions and to stimulate a "live" situation, 
instructions were presented on video tape. Each subject was informed 
that the second study would require her to interact with a partner.
The introduction of this partner at the beginning of the second study 
constituted the initial manipulation of the status characteristic. The 
characteristic we chose to manipulate wks age, and it was manipulated in 
two .־;ays: (1) The partner appeared on the monitor, so that she vtfas 
visible to the subject, and (2) the partner stated her age and other 
information indicative of her age. The subject herself was then put on 
camera and was asked the same questions by the taped experimenter that 
the partner had been asked. (./e had no difficulty getting live subjects 
to respond to taped questions.)
In fact the "partner" too was on video taoe. ubjects in the high 
status conditions found themselves interacting with an eleven year old 
girl, who, when asked to state what she liked to do in her spare time, 
replied: "I like to play with dolls and I like to play with my 
brother's electric train." Subjects in the low status conditions found 
themselves interacting with a woman 38 years old, who, in her spare time, 
liked to attend movies and listen to music. Since our objective was to 
break down the effects of a status differential, we deliberately tried 
to establish as big a status differential as possible with these 
manipulations. •Je succeeded.
\s soon as each subject and her "partner" had introduced themselves, 
another experimenter "interrupted", again on video tape, to announce 
that he had now computed the scores for both subjects on the tests they
had taken in the first study, and he proceeded to read the scores, 
tfhen the 11partner's" scores were read, the partner appeared on the 
subject's screen; when the subject's scores jere read, the subject 
appeared on her own screen, Subjects with the eleven year old partner 
found, to their dismay, that the partner had scored 22 and 23 on the 
tests, and that they themselves had only scored 4 and 5. The experi­
menter emphasized with reference to a scoring chart that the high 
scores were in the superior bracket which only 5 per cent of all 
persons tested managed to achieve; and that the low scores were in the 
poor bracket, also a category in kvhich only 5 per cent of all persons 
scored. Subjects with the 38 year old partner were given exactly the 
same information by the same taped experimenter, except that in this case 
the subjects had the high scores and the partners had the low scores.
This concluded our manipulation of the general performance characteristic.
3oth the age and performance manipulations were conducted prior to 
the subject's having been informed of her task in the second study.
Once the manipulation of the test scores :»as completed no mention was 
again made either of the tests or the abilities they were purported to 
measure. The age differential, however, was "reactivated" during the 
course of subsequent instructions in that both the subject and her 
partner were again put on camera. Thus the subject was once again 
reminded of the age of her partner.
In Conditions 1 and 2, we required that subjects be discriminated 
from their partner only by age. Therefore, these subjects were given 
no tests of ability and the performance manipulation was simply deleted. 
In Conditions 3 and 4, we required that subjects be discriminated only
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by their test performances. Ideally, in such a situation we would want
no status information to be present. But to make Conditions 3 and 4
comparable to the other conditions, we were required to show each subject
a partner on the television screen. In the absence of status information,
we felt that many subjects would pick up status cues from their undefined
partner and draw their own conclusions. It was preferable, we reasoned,
for all subjects in these conditions to have the same status information.
Therefore, we conducted a status-equal manipulation. This manipulation
consisted of the taped partner identifying herself as 19 years of age and
from the same school as the subject. This manipulation was inserted at the
same point in the instructions as were the status manipulations of the
3other conditions.
If we had not done a status-equal manipulation, we would have run the 
additional risk of subjects, .,ho were from local junior colleges, assuming 
that their partner was a student at the university ¿here the research was 
being conducted. This would have introduced another status variable into 
the experiment.
Having done a status-equal manipulation in Conditions 3 and 4, we 
could also have done a performance-equal manipulation in Conditions 1 and 
?., where the subjects differed only on status. However, our theory argues 
that subjects will perceive and act upon a similarity between the general 
performance characteristic and the task and hence if subjects are equal 
on the performance characteristic they may not differentiate on the task 
in terms of the status characteristic. Yet we must establish just such 
a status differential on the task to test our formulation.
The design that was finally adopted is the optimal one for mutual 
objectives of eliminating contamination in the data and testing the most 
relevant predictions of the theory.
After the performance and/or the initial status manipulations were 
performed, each subject .*as instructed on the task that she was now to 
perform collectively vtfith her partner. The task consisted of the 
subject deciding whether a solid ,jhite bar superimposed on a still 
photograph was, in the context of the photograph, greater or less than a 
distance in feet given her by the experimenter. ubjects were told that 
getting correct answers depended upon possessing an ability kno.m as 
"Spatial Judgment Ability". Each subject jas told that she would be 
given a ״patial Judgment Ability score at the end of the session. To 
assist the subject in getting correct answers, the subject was instructed 
that she would be allowed to make two choices on each slide, an initial 
choice and a final decision. The initial choices would not count in 
determining the score, but would be communicated to her partner, and her 
partner's choices would be communicated to her. Subjects were encouraged 
to take their partner's advice if they judged it would be helpful. 
Subjects made their choices and exchanged them .Jith their partner on a 
machine that showed the subjects' initial choice, the partners' initial 
choice, and the subjects' final decision. This •?as the only form of 
communication between the subject and her partner while performing the 
task.
Forty slides were presented on video tape to each subject. The 
machine on vjhich the subjects made and exchanged their choices ,;as 
constructed such that the experimenter was able to control the feedback 
each subject received from her partner. On thirty-two of the forty 
trials each subject found that her partner disagreed with her initial
choice. 3y a pre-arranged pattern, eight agreement trials .;ere 
inserted to allay subjects' suspicion of the disagreements. Our 
measure of influence consisted of counting the number of times the 
subject changed her initial choice on the 32 critical trials.
After the trials were completed, each subject .¿as interviewed to 
determine whether or not she was suspicious of the procedures and 
whether or not she understood the instructions. The purposes and exact 
nature of the experiment were then explained in detail and each subject 
ias paid for her participation.
Results
\ total of 145 subjects were run through the experiment, but 25 of 
these were either suspicious of the experimental procedures or failed 
to understand the instructions they were given. Since these subjects 
failed to meet the conditions necessary to test the theory, the theory 
cannot be said to apply to their behavior, and therefore they were 
excluded from the analysis. This left an N of 20 subjects, randomly 
assigned, for each of the six cells. The p(?) reported in Table I is 
the proportion of stay-responses, that is the proportion of times 
subjects in each condition stayed with their own initial choice in the 
face of a disagreement from their partner. This proportion is the 
empirical estimate of the probability of a self-resolution. Table I 
gives the pO), the mean number of stay-responses, and the variances 
about the mean number of stay-responses, by condition.
T\BLE I ABOUT HERE
TABLE I
Condition p(S> Mean Number 3-responses Variance N
1 . DH .74 23.6 10.9 20
2 . DL .57 18.2 8 . 0 20
3. GH .70 22.3 8.5 20
4. GL .59 19.0 37.1 20
5. DH-GL .59 18.9 20.9 20
5. DL-GH .69 22 .2 6 .2 20
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An examination of Table I of the proportion of stay-responses for 
each condition shows that the predictions of the theory are confirmed.
We find a p(S) of .74 for the DH condition and .57 for the DL condition, 
and for the ׳SH and GL conditions we have a p(C) of .70 and .59 
respectively. vJith these control conditions as a basis of comparison, 
we find in the experimental conditions that the p(S) for the DH-GL 
condition is .59 and the p(C' for the DL-GH condition is .69. It can 
be seen that the values for the GL and DH-GL conditions and the values 
for the GH and DL-GH conditions do not differ. Table II shows the 
results of the one-tailed Mann-Whitney U-tests performed on these 
differences.
TABLE II \B0UT HERE
An examination of the variances shows nothing unusual for the 
DH-DL, GH, and DL-GH conditions. None of these variances is high and 
all are in the same range. However, the variance for the GL condition 
is 37.1 and the variance for the DH-GL condition is 20.9. Each of 
these variances is substantially higher taan the variances for the 
other conditions. Since it is possible these high variances could 
reflect bi-modality, we present in Figures I and II histograms for the 
GL and DH-GL conditions. The issue of bi-modality is particularly 
significant in the DH-GL and the DL-GH conditions because the presence 
of bi-modality would suggest that some subjects are responding accord­
ing to their state of D while others are responding according to their 
state of G. The low variance in the DL-GH condition rules out this 
possibility; it remains to be seen whether bi-modality is present in the 
DH-GL condition.
TABLE II
MANN-WHITNEY U-TESTS FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONDITIONS
CONDITION P£-
DH vs. DL .001
GH vs. GL .025
DH-GL vs. DL-GH .01
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FIGURES I AND II ,!BOUT HERE
\1though the number of cases in each condition is too small to 
permit clear-cut inferences about the exact shape of the distributions, 
both Figures I and II show no evidence that the distributions for the 
GL and DH-GL conditions are bi-modal. 3oth distributions appear to be 
flat. In the absence of any evidence for bi-modality, the high variance 
in the GL condition is particularly curious, since this condition, along 
with the GH condition, is a replication of the experimental treatment 
reported by Freese (1969). Freese (1350) found no difference in the 
variances between the highs and lows, and both of those variances 
reported by him were low (8.1 and 8.0, respectively, for N's of 22 with 
440 critical trials) .
Discussion and Interpretation.
The theory predicted thsre would be no effects of the diffuse 
status characteristic in the determination of the observable po.;er and 
prestige order. Only one experimental outcome :*ould have been completely 
consistent with this prediction, and in fact this is the outcome we 
observed. The p(3) value in Table I show that the probability of reject­
ing influence attempts was a function of that state of the general perform 
ance characteristic subjects possessed, and even when subjects also posses 
sed an opposite state of a diffuse status characteristic the probability 
of rejecting influence attempts did not change. Subjects could have dif­
ferentiated in the observable power and prestige order on the basis of 
the status characteristic, in which case the probability of rejecting in­
fluence attempts for the DL-GH and DH-GL conditions should have been
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similar to the probabilities for the DL and DH conditions respectively; 
or, subjects could have differentiated on the basis of a combination of 
the status characteristic with the performance characteristic, in which 
case vie could have observed p(f>) values in the experimental conditions 
anywhere between the values of the control conditions. Je conclude the 
data show no effects of the status characteristic whatsoever, and that 
positions in the observable power and prestige order are solely a 
function of the general performance characteristic.
The absence of any effect of the diffuse status characteristic, 
however, either as the sole determiner of the observable power and 
prestige order or in combination with G, requires us to consider two 
alternative interpretations of our results. The first interpretation is 
that our experimental procedures made G so salient that subjects' percep 
tions of D were totally suppressed. The second alternative is that the 
task in the influence phase of the experiment was perceived as merely a 
continuation of the tasks used to manipulate G. Both of these inter­
pretations posit what from the point of view of our theory are experi­
mental artifacts; hence, it is necessary to examine these alternatives 
and to weigh them against our theory as an explanation for our failure 
to find any effects of the status characteristic.
Let us consider the salience agrument first. To argue that 3 was 
the only salient characteristic in the influence phase of the experi­
ment is to argue that our experimental procedures failed to elimi.nate 
that possibility. It might be well then to review our experimental 
procedures.
For the manipulation of G subjects were given two tests of 
performance at the outset of the experiment prior to even knowing they
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had a partner. Their scores were not reported to them at this time.
Upon completing the tests, they were led to what was described to them 
as a second and different experiment. This second experiment took place 
in a different building and with different research assistants acting 
as experimenters. In this second phase subjects were introduced over 
television to their "partner" with .!/hom they were told they should 
collaborate and with whom they exchanged status information. ill of 
the instructions in this phase were presented via closed circuit 
television. After the exchange of status information in the introduc­
tion, the camera switched to an unidentified experimenter n/ho inter­
rupted the instructions to inform subjects of their о m  and their 
partner's scores on the first two tests. During this manipulation, 
subjects were again shown to each other on the TV screen. The 
instructions for the second phase then resumed, and during a sub­
sequent demonstration of the use of the equipment subjects were again 
shown their partner on the TV screen, for the third and last time.
The procedures, then, were designed to disconnect the test-taking 
and the characteristics that were presumably being tested from the 
interaction experiment. Subjects vie re alone in the test-talcing phase, 
different experimenters were used, and the two phases were conducted in 
separate buildings. It is important to note that during the interaction 
phase information about the diffuse status characteristic was introduced 
prior to, during, and subsequent to the manipulation of the test scores 
comprising G. Thus neither a principle of primacy nor a principle of 
recency can be used to argue that the G characteristic was more salient. 
Furthermore, the manipulation of D was part and parcel of the second
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phase, since in this phase subjects were supposed to interact and 
cooperate with each other. The manipulations of G, on the other hand, 
was an interruption to that phase, divorced entirely from its context, 
an irrelevant aside that could easily have been forgotten. On these 
grounds it is difficult to argue that G was any more salient than D, 
nor is there any evidence that the experimenter communicated to the 
subjects that they should "pay more attention to G rather than D."
'Jhile it is possible that none of our devices succeeded, and an 
inadvertent experimental bias accounts for the results, such an 
interpretation is at best ad hoc. In the absence of any clear evidence 
supporting this a¿ hoc interpretation, the safest course is to prefer 
our theoretical explanation for the absence of an effect of the status 
characteristic. Specifically, we refer to Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 
It should be recalled that Assumption 2.1 states three necessary 
conditions for combining to occur: (1) two elements are relevant to 
each other, or (2) two elements have the same evaluation, or, (3) 
either element has no sub-el aments. None of these conditions were
present in our experimental manipulations and therefore combining was
4
not to be expected. Assumption 2.1 therefore appears to be the best 
available interpretation to explain why combining was not found.
' These three conditions, however, were present in an experiment 
reported by Berger and Fisek (1970) in which a combination effect was 
found. Thus both our own data and the Berger and Fisek results are 
consistent with Assumption 2.1.
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Assumption 2.2 explains why G alone, and not D alone, determined 
observable power and prestige: G was similar to the task characteris­
tic, in the sense of Definition 5, and D was not.
The second alternative interpretation argues that because the task 
in the interaction phase of the experiment can be perceived as a test 
and because tests were used in the first ohase of the experiment to 
allow the manipulation of G, we automatically established a similarity 
between G and the task characteristic. Now, our theory argues that 
subjects generalize states of G to the task situation because they 
perceive a similarity between G and the task characteristic. 3ut it 
is possible to question whether our results are in fact due to this 
process of generalizing states of similar characteristics or whether 
our results are due to the artifact th t we were using "tests". It 
could be, although we have no positive evidence to suggest it, that 
"testing situations" unintentionally establish a similarity between G 
and the task characteristic rather than allowing the subjects to draw 
their own conclusions. Both G and the task required specific, abilities 
with which the subjects .*ere previously unacquainted, but subjects were 
aware that they were going to receive a score for their performance at 
the interaction task, and therefore subjects could have interpreted the 
task as a test just like the tests that constituted G.
It would be fruitless to analyze how much similarity between these 
characteristics is "too much" similarity. Suffice it to say thit the 
theory is asserted not to hold when the characteristics are dissociated-- 
/>hen there are definite beliefs that the characteristics are not relevant 
to one another--but on the other hand the theory is trivial or at best
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untested if the characteristics are initially associated in the minds 
of the subjects or if the association results from experimenter cues 
that force such an association. The best evidence we can cite to rule 
out the "artifact" interpretation of the similarity of our experimental 
characteristics is not to appeal to the subtle differences in meaning 
communicated by our experimental instructions, but rather is to appeal 
to alternative and independent evidence that also has bearing on the 
theory.
Cohen, et al (1371) and Roper (1971) report the results of some 
experiments in which pairs of Negro and white boys of the same age 
were manipulated on a G characteristic and were then required to per­
form a collective task. In this experiment blacks were manipulated 
high on the G characteristic and, although whites were not directly 
manipulated, by our definition which implies the relativity of self- 
other expectations we can infer that whites were in a low-high state. 
Subjects were given no information on whether the specific performance 
characteristics comprising G were related or not related to the task 
characteristic. Jhat were these characteristics? G consisted of 
building a radio set and teaching someone else to build a radio set.
The task characteristic on which measures of observable power and 
prestige were taken consisted of the subjects playing a cooperative 
game. There can be no question here that the choice of characteristics 
unintentionally established a priori some similarity between states of 
G and states of the task characteristic; clearly no such experimental 
artifact was present. Yet Cohen, et al (1371) and Roper (1971) report 
that the manipulation of G had a powerful effect upon subsequent task 
interaction. On several measures of power and prestige differences
Vtheir results, taken as a whole, are consistent with and predicted 
by our formulation.
Given the choice of experimental characteristics by Cohen, et al 
(1971) and Roper (1971) and given their subsequent results, it is 
difficult to adopt any interpretation other than that their subjects 
perceived states of G to be similar to states of C on their o.m 
authority and drew the behavioral consequences predicted by our theory. 
If such a process in fact occurred in the Cohen, et al (1971) and 
Roper (1971) experiments, this lends credence to the contention that 
the same process occurred in our experiment. To the extent that we 
have independent knowledge that the process we have formulated does 
operate under the conditions specified, we are justified in rejecting-־ 
particularly in the absence of any positive evidence־־a post hoc 
interpretation of experimental artifact for our own results: the 
preponderance of the evidence is against it. Of course, we do not 
claim that because the generalization process worked for Cohen, et al 
(1971'» and Roper (1971) it therefore must have worked in our experiment. 
Rather, we must choose between two alternatives, that the generalization 
process worked as specified by the theory or that our results are a 
function of experimental artifacts. Since it is always possible to 
suppose after the fact that results were a function of experimental 
artifacts; since we have no positive evidence to suggest such artifacts 
vjere present in our experiment; since our results were predicted by the 
theory; and since other investigators have found independent evidence 
to support the theory, we reject the hypothesis that the generalization 
process was induced by an experimenter bias.
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Finally, we wish to briefly consider the interpretation that our 
results are unreliable. In both the GL and DH-GL conditions we observed 
variances that were extremely high in comparison with the other conditions. 
We have already pointed out that Figures I and II show no evidence for 
bi-modality. Vie frankly confess to having no acceptable interpretation 
to explain why, out of six conditions, two conditions should show high 
variance. The common denominator between these two conditions is that 
subjects were manipulated low on a general performance characteristic, 
and the obvious suggestion is that there might be something peculiar 
about our test population when forced to differentiate low on such a 
characteristic. However, this interpretation quickly dissolves when we 
consider that the GL condition is a replication, with minor procedural 
variations, of the exoerimental treatment reported by Freese (195S).
Freese (1969) found no unusually high variances for low subjects using 
the same test population that we used, and furthermore he reports the 
same degree of differentiation of influence at the same task. In view 
of this we are inclined to reject the interpretation that our p(S) 
values are unreliable due to a peculiar distribution or some unknown 
characteristic of the sample.
tfe have considered three alternative interpretations to our results: 
(1) the results were a function of greater salience of the G character­
istic; (s) the results were a function of an artificial similarity of 
the manipulation and interaction phases of the experiment as "testing 
situations"; (3) the results were a function of an accidental distribu­
tion of population characteristics and so are unreliable. We reject all 
three interpretations and conclude that the results of our experiment 
lend strong support for the theory.
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We are particularly encouraged by these results in view of the 
extent to which the status generalization phenomenon permeates social 
behavior. Anyone who has ever possessed the low state of a diffuse 
status characteristic--such as blacks, rfomen, youth, and others--has 
been a victim of the halo effect of such a characteristic. To infer 
that a given black is lazy just because he is black, or that any given 
woman is illogical just because she is female, or that any given youth 
is inexperienced just because he is young is to perpetuate at least a 
disservice and at best an indignity. Yet, apparently under certain 
conditions, just such a halo effect is a normal reaction of individuals 
to that set of conditions. The problem from a theoretical point of 
view is to specify an additional set of conditions that, when operative, 
intervene to eliminate that halo effect. The theory presented here is 
a significant step in that direction, but we have yet to specify a 
set of conditions that is sufficient to eliminate the halo effect 
per se. We «?ill have succeeded in doing that only when we can show 
that when actors are discriminated only by some status characteristic 
they will not generalize to a new situation. This would require us to 
specify an additional set of conditions to the already-existing theory 
of Merger, Cohen, and Zelditch (1965^, which describes that process.
\  successful test of such a formulation should show no differences, in 
terms of the data reported in the present experiment, between the DH 
and DL conditions. Je are currently engaged in efforts to specify the 
appropriate set of theoretical conditions.
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